Electronic Voting Machines and Paper Ballots
The mechanics of how votes are physically cast and recorded sit at the center of public confidence in election administration. This page covers the definition and regulatory scope of electronic voting machines (EVMs) and paper ballot systems, the technical processes by which each records and tabulates votes, the scenarios in which each system—or a hybrid of both—is deployed, and the criteria that govern decisions about which system a jurisdiction uses. Understanding these distinctions is foundational to topics covered across the broader elections resource at /index.
Definition and scope
Electronic voting machines are hardware systems used to record, store, and in some configurations transmit vote data in a federal, state, or local election. The category encompasses two primary device classes: Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) systems, which capture votes digitally without producing a contemporaneous paper record unless equipped with a printer, and Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs), which assist voters in marking a paper ballot that is then scanned and tabulated separately.
Paper ballots, by contrast, are physical documents—either hand-marked or machine-marked—that serve as the official record of a voter's selections. When paired with optical scan tabulators, paper ballots form the dominant voting system design in use across the United States as of the 2020 election cycle (Election Assistance Commission, 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey).
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. § 20901) established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and set minimum federal standards for voting systems, including accessibility requirements that directly shaped DRE deployment. The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)—updated to VVSG 2.0 in 2021—define testable requirements for accuracy, auditability, and security that certified systems must meet (EAC, VVSG 2.0).
Jurisdiction over specific system choices rests with state and local election authorities. As of the 2022 midterm cycle, 47 states required or encouraged the use of paper records for at least a portion of their voting systems, according to Verified Voting Foundation's Verifier database.
How it works
Optical Scan Systems (paper-based)
Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Systems
The critical structural difference between these two approaches is the timing and independence of the paper record. In optical scan systems, the paper ballot is the original record. In DRE systems, the electronic record is primary, and any VVPAT is derivative—a design distinction with direct consequences for election audits and recounts.
Common scenarios
Polling place hand-marked paper ballots with optical scan: The predominant configuration in the United States. A voter marks a paper ballot privately, then feeds it into a precinct-count optical scanner before leaving. The scanner provides immediate feedback if a ballot contains an overvote (marking more candidates than permitted).
Ballot Marking Devices for accessibility: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and HAVA, polling places must provide at least one accessible voting unit per location. BMDs fulfill this requirement by allowing voters with visual, motor, or cognitive disabilities to make selections electronically, then produce a human-readable and machine-scannable paper ballot identical in function to a hand-marked ballot.
Centralized absentee and mail ballot counting: Mail-in and absentee ballots are returned to a central facility where high-speed optical scanners process large volumes. These systems differ from precinct-level scanners in throughput capacity—commercial central-count units can process upward of 10,000 ballots per hour.
DRE-only jurisdictions: A shrinking configuration. After security research—most prominently findings presented at the DEFCON Voting Village beginning in 2017—demonstrated exploitable vulnerabilities in widely deployed DRE models, states including Georgia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina replaced paperless DREs with paper-based systems between 2019 and 2020.
Hybrid deployments: Large jurisdictions often deploy BMDs universally (replacing hand-marking entirely) alongside optical scanners. This approach is contested; critics argue universal BMD deployment reintroduces DRE-like risks because voters may not review the printed output, reducing the independence of the paper record.
Decision boundaries
Jurisdictions navigating system selection face a defined set of criteria that separate legitimate operational choices from configurations that fall below federal or state standards.
Auditability threshold: Any system deployed in a jurisdiction subject to a risk-limiting audit (RLA) requirement must produce a voter-marked or voter-verified paper record. 42 states had adopted or were piloting RLAs as of the 2022 cycle (MIT Election Data and Science Lab). A DRE without VVPAT cannot satisfy an RLA requirement.
Certification status: Systems must hold EAC certification under VVSG standards, or state-level certification under an equivalent process, to be legally deployed in most states. Uncertified hardware or software constitutes a prohibited configuration regardless of local preference.
Accessibility mandate vs. paper trail mandate: Where a state mandates paper records for all votes and the ADA requires accessible systems, BMDs that produce paper ballots satisfy both requirements simultaneously. Paperless DREs satisfy the ADA mandate but not the paper record mandate—a conflict that drove replacement procurement across multiple states.
Post-election audit triggers: The election audit process and the recount process both depend on the existence of a retrievable, voter-verified original record. Jurisdictions using paper-based systems can conduct hand-count audits of randomly selected batches. Jurisdictions relying solely on DRE electronic records cannot independently verify the machine's count against any external record—a structural vulnerability that most state legislatures and election security frameworks have moved to eliminate.
Procurement and testing timelines: The EAC's certification process for new voting system versions typically requires 12 to 24 months from submission to approval, meaning jurisdictions cannot replace systems on short notice before a scheduled election. This constraint shapes the practical decision window for any technology transition.